### NEG CP

#### Counterplan:

#### The United States federal government should

#### abolish its security cooperation, transferring relevant resources and responsibilities to the State Department, and

#### substantially increase State Department security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

#### DoS security assistance solves case

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, former speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /MSU-KM

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system.

Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill.

There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD.

#### **BUT plan and perm’s retention of DoD security cooperation is a slippery slope to bureaucratic militarization – turns solvency**

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, former speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /MSU-KM

The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking.

The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money.

The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.

#### Overly militarized NATO cooperation bad, etc.

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### NEG AT: Perm: Do Counterplan

#### “Cooperation” must be DoD – “assistance” is DoS

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The What, Why, and How of Security Assistance

“Security assistance” refers to a specific set of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. These programs are overseen by the State Department in cooperation with the Department of Defense. “Security cooperation” describes separately authorized Defense Department-led activities such as “global train and equip” programs. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which has provided military aid to that country since 2016, is one such example of these programs run by the Pentagon. I will use the more common term here, security assistance, in reference to either type. When security assistance works well, it gives partner nations the tools to address internal instability and deter and defend against external adversaries, reducing the likelihood that direct U.S. intervention will be called for in the future. It also helps to ensure that the United States maintains access, basing, and overflight privileges, strengthens interoperability, and accrues the less tangible benefit of military-to-military personal relationships.

#### Prefer legal predictability

DoD 21 Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, <https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf> /MSU-KM

On 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

According to Title 10 U.S. Code Section 301, the term “security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Other DoD policy statements identify DoD-managed or administered security assistance programs as components of security cooperation.

The purpose of this first chapter is to provide definitions of the various programs within security assistance and the broader area of security cooperation.

Security Assistance

Over the years, security assistance has included programs authorized by the FAA or AECA. According to the FAA, as amended, the term “Security Assistance” means military assistance, economic support funding, military education and training, peacekeeping operations, anti-terrorism assistance, sales of defense articles or services, export to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other international security forces of a foreign country. While many of these programs are administered by the DoD, specifically by DSCA, they remain under the general control of the Department of State (DoS).

#### The core meaning differentiates based on oversight authority, NOT content

Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf> /MSU-KM

Terminology

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD formally defines security assistance as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

DOD uses the overarching term “security cooperation” to denote the State Department security assistance administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8

Basic Terms Used in This Report

This report uses “security assistance” in its generic sense of assistance to foreign military and other security forces as the default term for assistance provided and activities conducted under U.S. Code Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) and Title 10 (Armed Forces), as well as under provisions of an annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) when both are discussed. (Assistance provided under both Title 10 and NDAAs are collectively referred to as “Title 10 authorities.”)

When only Title 10 authorities are involved, the term “security cooperation” is used. Where possible, this report uses specific terms, for instance, “military assistance” for programs that involve only foreign military forces, or “humanitarian assistance” for DOD programs that provide disaster relief and other forms of humanitarian aid to foreign populations.

#### That means counterplan’s “assistance” can include DoD involvement BUT “cooperation” cannot include DoS control

White 14 Taylor P. White, Major, USMC, Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” Joint Force Quarterly 72, 1-1-2014, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-72/Article/577493/security-cooperation-how-it-all-fits/ /MSU-KM

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is foreign assistance, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for foreign assistance and nation assistance, we find significant overlap:

Foreign assistance to foreign nations [ranges] from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3

This term is likely to resonate with the State Department, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by State to be administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and other civilian agency involvement.

### AFF: Perm: Do Counterplan

#### Their Serafino ev is decisively AFF – their definition of “security cooperation” includes DoS “security assistance”

Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf> /MSU-KM

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#### Their legal precision ev agrees – the plan can be DoS authority with DoD involvement

DoD 21 Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, <https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf> /MSU-KM

Introduction

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day-to-day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD)-funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. In order for U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments to better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998.

In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs while also leading the wider USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs), or the military departments (MILDEPs). Further complicating the management of security cooperation was the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation. This point of contact was either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)- sponsored Defense Attaché Office (DAO) or the DSCA-sponsored Security Cooperation Office (SCO). These two spigots of security cooperation within a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD, its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations.

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**Foreign Military Sales**

The foreign military sales (FMS) program is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG. The purchasing government pays all costs associated with a sale. There is a signed governmentto-government agreement, normally documented in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), between the USG and a foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a “case” and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under FMS, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DoD stocks (Section 21, AECA) or from new procurement (Section 22, AECA). If the source of supply is new procurement, based on an LOA accepted by the foreign government, the USG agency or MILDEP assigned cognizance for this case is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual arrangement with U.S. industry to provide the article or service requested.

FMS is a large program with the final FMS total for FY 2020 being $50.8 billion. This includes $2.69 billion in Title 10 grant assistance programs.

**Foreign Military Construction Services**

Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS) is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA and authorized by Section 29, AECA, which designates the President to sell design and construction services to any eligible foreign country or international organization. The construction sales agreement and sales procedures generally parallel those of FMS and are usually implemented by the MILDEP civil engineering agencies.

**Foreign Military Financing Program**

The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) is an appropriated program administered by DSCA that has undergone a variety of substantive and terminological changes over the years. At present, the program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans, which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training generally through FMS, or direct commercial sales (DCS) for select countries. Foreign military sales credit (FMSCR) is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24, AECA, and originally served to provide credit (loans) as an effective means for easing the transition of foreign governments from grant aid, e.g., Military Assistance Program (MAP) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), to cash purchases.

Prior to FY 1989, the USG variously identified this financing program as the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program or the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program. In the FY 1989 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA), Congress introduced a new title, the FMFP, and further identified the forgiven loan/forgiven credit component of the program as FMFP grants to distinguish them from repayable direct FMFP loans. Additionally, the terms non-repayable loans or non-repayable credits are often used by various security assistance organizations (including DSCA) in place of the term “FMFP grants.”

Beginning in FY 1992, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) changed the method of accounting and budgeting for all government loans, including FMFP loans issued under the AECA. This legislation provides a more accurate portrayal of the true cost of loans by providing new budget authority only for the subsidy element of the loan program and is the basis for the establishment of two new financial accounts:

• The first contains only the FMFP grant portion of the program administrative costs.

• The second account provides the budget authority needed to fund the subsidy element of the proposed loan programs.

While there are previously authorized FMFP loans still being repaid to the USG, the FMFP grant element (no repayment) has become the norm.

Over the past several years, per the Presidential Policy Directive 23 of April 2013 (PPD 23), new FMF pilot programs have been established under the authority of Section 23 of the AECA—the Foreign Military Financing Challenge Fund (FMFCF) and Foreign Military Financing Regional Funds (FMFRF). The FMFCF is intended to provide one-time investments for special projects for a partner nation that has demonstrated political will to pursue reform efforts, contribute to common goals, and build lasting, self-sustaining capabilities. The FMFRF provides flexibility and responsiveness in implementing portions of the FMF program based upon geographic region. For example, in FY 2016, $5 million was provided for the FMF European Security Assistance Fund (ESAF). Through a competitive proposal system, these FY 2016 ESAF funds are available for countries in Europe and Eurasia that have received bilateral FMF within the five fiscal years prior to submission.

FMFP funding for FY 2020 was $6.15 billion. FMFP appropriations are generally grants repayable or non-repayable loans.

**Leases**

Chapter 6, AECA, authorizes the President to lease defense articles to friendly governments or international organizations for up to five years (renewable). This non-appropriated program is administered by DSCA. The law allows the lease of defense articles only for compelling foreign policy or national security reasons, and stipulates the recipient, with some exceptions, must bear the full cost of the lease. Furthermore, the U.S. must not need the leased articles during the lease period, and the U.S. retains the right to terminate the lease at any time. For the recipient country, leases may be cheaper than purchasing the article outright, and they provide a convenient vehicle for obtaining defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a lease agreement, with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support and/or transportation, if required.

**Military Assistance Program**

In FY 1990, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was formally merged with the FMFP as Congress adopted an administration proposal for integrating all MAP grant funding into the appropriations account for the FMFP. DSCA administered this appropriated program. However, Congress has not appropriated MAP funds for subsequent fiscal years, and there is no interest in seeking any such funds for the future. Therefore, this legislative charge had the dual effect of causing existing MAP-funded programs to lose their former identity and become FMFP-funded programs and establishing the FMFP as the major U.S. financing program for the acquisition of U.S. defense articles and services by foreign governments.

MAP remains a current security assistance program because MAP-provided articles remain throughout the world. As such, these articles retain their End-Use Monitoring (EUM) requirements: their return to the USG when no longer needed and the return to the USG any proceeds from scrapping or sale to a third country.

**International Military Education and Training**

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides grant financial assistance for training in the U.S. and, in some cases, in overseas facilities to selected foreign military and civilian personnel. In earlier years, grant aid training of foreign military personnel was funded as part of the MAP appropriation. Starting with FY 1976, a separate authorization for IMET was established in Section 541, FAA. DSCA administrates this appropriated program. Although historically a relatively modest program in terms of cost, both the President and Congress attach significant importance to this program. The recipient countries, likewise, rely heavily on this grant program and, in many cases, serve as the only method to receive training from the U.S. military.

At a time of competition for resources, IMET advances U.S. objectives globally at a relatively small cost. In many countries, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with firsthand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and influence for our diplomatic and military representatives. Thus, a relatively small amount of IMET funding will provide a return for U.S. policy goals, over the years, far greater than the original investment.

In 1980, Section 644(m)(5), FAA, was amended to authorize IMET tuition costing in terms of the additional costs that the USG incurs in furnishing such assistance. Section 21(a)(1)(C), AECA, was also amended to allow IMET recipients to purchase FMS training on an additional cost basis. The practical effect of these changes was to reduce tuition costs substantially for IMET-funded students, thereby increasing the amount of training an eligible country can obtain by using both national funds for FMS purchases and alloted IMET grant funds.

**Expanded IMET**

The FY 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (FOAA) introduced an IMET initiative via a Senate-proposed earmark of $1 million to be used exclusively for expanded IMET courses for foreign officers. Congress later allowed this initiative to include civilian managers and administrators of defense establishments. The focus of such training is on developing professional-level management skills, with emphasis on military justice systems, codes of conduct, and the protection of human rights. Congress amended Section 541, FAA to permit non-Ministry of Defense civilian government personnel to be eligible for this program, if such military education and training would do the following:

• Contribute to responsible defense resource management

• Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military

• Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts

• Improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights

In FY 1993, Congress further extended this expanded IMET (E-IMET) program to also include participation by national legislators who are responsible for oversight and management of the military. Through P.L.104-164, Congress again amended the E-IMET program authority in 1996 to also include non-governmental organization personnel.

In the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $111 million for IMET for 2019. In FY 2020, $112 million was appropriated and $113 million in FY 2021 by the Further Consolidation Appropriations Act of 2021.

**Drawdowns and Special Presidential Waiver Authority**

During a crisis, Section 506, FAA, authorizes the President to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include transportation and spares. There is a $100 million ceiling per fiscal year on articles, services, and training provided for military purposes and another fiscal year ceiling of $200 million for articles, services, and training required for non-military purposes such as disaster relief, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, and Vietnam War-era prisoners of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) location and repatriation. When emergency support for peacekeeping operations is required, Section 552(c)(2), FAA, separately authorizes the President to drawdown up to $25 million per fiscal year in USG articles and services from any agency. Special drawdown authorities have been annually legislated in the State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriation Acts (S/FOAA). When the USG avails DoD defense articles, services, or training via drawdowns, DSCA administers these nonappropriated authorities.

**Economic Support Fund**

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is authorized by Chapter 4 of Part II of the FAA. ESF is an appropriated program administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Congress established this fund to promote economic and political stability in areas where the U.S. has special political and security interests and where the U.S. has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major economic or political crises. ESF is a flexible economic instrument available on a grant basis for a variety of purposes, including balance of payments support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance development projects in addition to funding a variety of programs to enhance political stability. In earlier years, the ESF program included concessional (i.e., low interest rate) loans as well as grants; recently, all ESF funds receive allocation as grant assistance. While a substantial amount of these ESF grants are used to provide balance of payments, the ESF also provides for programs aimed at primary needs in health, education, agriculture, and family planning. Where long-term political and economic stability is the primary concern, ESF finances projects that meet the basic needs of the poor.

In the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $2.5 billion for ESF for 2019. The FY 2020 appropriations were $3 billion but decreased in FY 2021 to $2 billion.

**Peacekeeping Operations**

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is an appropriated program authorized by Chapter 6 of Part II of the FAA. For several years, PKO provided funds for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which implemented the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Subsequent funding has been provided to support peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, East Timor, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Darfur region of the Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia.

**Global Peace Operations Initiative**

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which has become the principal PKO program, was originally a Presidential initiative in coordination with other G-8 countries to increase the capacity of selected countries to deploy in support of international peacekeeping operations. It was envisioned as a five-year program (FYs 2005–2009) to train seventy-five thousand troops worldwide, with emphasis in the Africa region and building an African command headquarters capability. GPOI supports the deployment of peacekeepers by providing equipment, transportation, training, and sustainment in the field. A DoS program requiring DoD support, GPOI subsumed the previous SA-funded PKO Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and the FMFP- funded Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program. The ACOTA term is still used when referring to the Africa training component of GPOI.

In the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $163 million for PKO for 2019. The FY 2020 Act appropriated $457 million. In FY 2021, this number decreased to $441 million. All PKO appropriations are grants managed by the DoS.

**International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement**

The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program is an appropriated grant program which the DoS administers. Authorized by Section 481, FAA, INCLE is intended to suppress the worldwide illicit manufacture and trafficking of narcotic and psychotropic drugs, money laundering, and precursor chemical diversion, and the progressive elimination of the cultivation of any crops from which such drugs are derived. Recently, the elimination of related narco-terrorism has been included. This program can include the purchase of defense articles, services, and training. This is similar to the authorized and funded programs within DoD and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.

The 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act appropriated $1.49 billion for INCLE. The FY 2020 appropriations were slightly reduced to $1.39 billion. The FY 2021 appropriations were further reduced to $1.38 billion.

**Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs**

The DoS administers a series of appropriated grant programs collectively known as the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) programs. Part II, Chapters 8 and 9 of the FAA and Section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act authorize NADR. Additionally, Section 23, AECA, for NADR focuses on demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. Related defense articles, services, and training can be provided through this program. U.S. funding support for the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission is provided through this program. The DoD role in this program is that DoS can purchase demining, unexploded ordnance clearance, and anti-terrorism systems with this funding.

In the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $655 million for NADR for 2018. The FY 2019 appropriation was for $864 million. In FY 2020, Congress appropriated $895 million. In FY 2021, Congress appropriated $889 million.

**Direct Commercial Sales**

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are commercial exports of defense articles, services, and training licensed under the authority of Section 38, AECA, made by U.S. defense industry directly to a foreign government. Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, DoD does not administer DCS transactions, and a DCS sale does not normally include a government-to-government agreement. Rather, the DoS Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC) implements the required USG controls through licensing. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) [22 CFR 120-130] contains the dayto-day rules and procedures for Direct Commercial Sales.

The DoS grants regulatory approval for over $136 billion worth of sales requests per year. Of note, not all license approvals will result in signed contracts and actual deliveries. Like FMS, DCS deliveries are likely to take place years after U.S. industry obtains the export license from PM/DDTC and the interested parties sign the commercial contract.

**Other Security Assistance Programs**

***Excess Defense Articles***

Excess defense articles (EDA) identified by the MILDEP or DoD agency are authorized for sale using the FMS authority in Section 21, AECA, and FMS processes identified within the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) for property belonging to the USG. Prices range from 5 to 50 percent of original acquisition value, depending on the condition of the article.

Additionally, Section 516, FAA, authorizes the President to transfer EDA on a grant basis to eligible countries (annually identified within a joint DoD/DoS letter to Congress). While EDA can be transferred at no cost, the recipient must typically pay for any transportation or repair charges. Under certain circumstances, transportation charges may be waived, with the cost absorbed by DoD-appropriated funds.

***Third-Country Transfers***

Section 3(d), AECA, authorizes the President to manage and approve the transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles from the original recipient country to a third country. Requests for third-country transfers are normally approved if the USG is willing to conduct a direct transfer to the third country. Countries must obtain third-country transfer authority in writing from the DoS in advance of the proposed transfer. This applies to all U.S.-origin defense articles regardless of the method of original transfer from the USG or U.S. industry. More can be found on this subject in the chapter on End-Use Monitoring and Third-Party Transfers.

Security Cooperation

While all of the programs previously mentioned are authorized under 22 U.S.C (Title 22), and are under the general control of the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD) administers many of them. Title 10 U.S. Code Section 301 defines security cooperation programs and activities of DoD as any program or interaction of U.S.C. with the security establishment of a foreign country to build capabilities, provide access or build relationships. As such, many of the previously described FAA and AECA-authorized security assistance programs administered by the DoD, in accordance with the SAMM, fall under the broad definition of security cooperation. The following is a categorization of programs, and a brief explanation, based upon a partial list presented in the 2016 DoD Guidance for Security Cooperation. For more detail on the different programs that can be found under each category, access and download the Security Cooperation Programs book found on the DSCU website or use the SC Programs Viewer on the Security Assistance Network Web (SANweb).

**Train and Equip/Security Cooperation: DoS Administered Title 22**

This category includes security assistance programs previously identified and described, and these programs are normally implemented and managed by DoS, USAID, or both. While under the authority of DoS, DoD provides material assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. These programs are authorized by either the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 2151, et. seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.):

• Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)

• Drawdowns

• Economic Support Fund (ESF)

• Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

• Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)

• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

• Third-Country Transfers

**Train and Equip/Security Assistance: DoD-Administered Title 22**

This category includes security assistance programs previously identified and described. While under the authority of DoS, DoD provides materiel assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. These programs are also authorized by either the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 2151, et. seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.):

• Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

• Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)

• Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

• Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS)

• International Military Education and Training (IMET)

• Leases

• Military Assistance Program (MAP)

**Train and Equip/Security Cooperation: Title 10 Programs**

Under the authority of Title 10, Chapter 16, and/or the current National Defense Authorization Act, DoD provides material assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. This is normally done using DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, but, in some instances, Congress appropriates additional funding for DoD to conduct these programs. Although it is DoD funding, these programs, and all security cooperation, must be coordinated with DoS. Security Cooperation practitioners refer to these programs as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs and execute them using a pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance. All BPC programs require congressional notification. Below are just a few examples. Examples with four digits in quotes represent temporary authorities whose authorizations can be found in various National Defense Authorizations Acts.

• “1022” Authority to Provide Counterdrug (CD)-Funded Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

• “1206” Training of Security Forces and Associated Security Ministries of Foreign Countries to Promote Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights

• “1226” Support to Certain Governments for Border Security Operations

• 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity

• Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

• European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)

• Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)

• Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)

• Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)

***Operational Support***

Operational support assistance programs are designed to enable partner countries to participate in coalition operations by developing specific capabilities needed for said operations. Alternately, they might focus on enhanced interoperability among partner countries and sustain partner operations in cases where partner countries cannot sustain operations on their own. These are normally done using DoD O&M funding and congressionally appropriated funds. These programs, and all security cooperation, must be coordinated with DoS. Below are just a few examples:

• “1234” Logistics Support for Coalition Forces Supporting Certain U.S. Military Operations

• “1207” Cross Servicing Agreements for Loan of Personnel Protection and Personnel Survivability Equipment in Coalition Operations

• “1233” Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

• 331, Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations

• Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

• Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP)

***Defense Institution Building (DIB)***

DIB, as per the 27 January 2016 DoD Directive 5205.82, is the development and capacity building of partner nation defense institutions, normally at the ministerial or chief of defense level, in support of U.S. foreign policy and security cooperation goals. According to this directive, DIB attempts to promote principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive to national political systems, especially regarding good governance, oversight of security forces, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

Some areas of focus for DIB are defense institutions, organizations and processes that can ensure effective oversight, management, and execution of logistics, personnel, budgets, policy, strategy, and doctrine for effective development, employment, and sustainment of defense capabilities.

DIB is authorized and funded under Title 10, Section 332, Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building to bring into the Partner Nation (PN) both full-time resident advisors and long-term, episodic Subject Matter Expert teams. Funding from other programs can also be used for DIB related training, education, and professional development.

***International Armaments Cooperation***

International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) can best be described as U.S. bilateral and multilateral agreements with partner countries focused on three cooperative areas. First, to share the costs associated with the cooperative research, development, test, evaluation, and production of mutually required weapons systems or components, defense technologies, systems, or equipment; second, to foster joint production and follow-on support of defense articles or equipment; and, third, to procure foreign technology, equipment, systems or logistics support. Over time, a variety of names have been applied to this area of cooperation to include Armaments Cooperation, International Armaments Cooperation (IAC), International Armaments Cooperation Programs (IACP), and Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA). Chapter 13 of this book provides more information on this topic. Below are just a few examples:

• Information Exchange Program (IEP)

• 311, Exchange of Defense Personnel Between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries

• Test and Evaluation Program (TEP)

• Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) Program

• Cooperative Research, Development, and Acquisition Programs

• Defense Trade

• Cooperative Logistics

***Humanitarian Assistance***

Humanitarian assistance consists of a group of security cooperation programs designed to improve DoD access, visibility, and influence in a partner nation (PN) or region and to build the capacity of the PN government while addressing a humanitarian need. Combatant commands (CCMDs) may carry out activities funded by Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) across respective Unified Command Plan (UCP) theaters, offering DoD another tool to promote regional stability and security. Requests for OHDACA funds for any of these programs are generally initiated by the in-country SCO. The CCMD then consolidates and prioritizes before forwarding to DSCA for any required coordination with DoS/USAID and the military departments. It should be noted that the DoS has parallel programs generally managed by USAID in response to any requests by the affected U.S. embassy responding to country requirements. DoS and USAID annually receive even more funding for overseas humanitarian, disaster, and migration assistance programs. Below are just a few examples:

• Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM)

• Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

• Excess Property as Humanitarian Relief

• Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)

• Humanitarian Assistance Transportation Program (HATP)

• Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) during Military Operations

• DoD Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

• Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR)

• Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)

• Space-A Transport of NGO Relief

***Education***

There are many security cooperation programs that provide education opportunities to PN military and civilian personnel. Training can take place in the U.S., in the PN’s country and in some cases in a third country. Training can include professional military education, tactical training, and/or technical skills training when they acquire new equipment from the U.S. Below are just a few examples:

• “1206” Training of Security Forces and Associated Security Ministries of Foreign Countries to Promote Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights

• 342, Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS)

• 345, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program (CTIWFP)

• 346, Distribution to Certain Foreign Personnel of Education and Training Material and Information Technology to Enhance Military Interoperability with the Armed Forces

• 347, International Engagement Authorities for Service Academies

• 348, Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)

• Attendance at the USCG Academy

***Exercises***

Combined exercises are exercises between the U.S. forces and those of one or more countries. It is common error to refer to these exercises as multinational, coalition, or joint operations, but this is doctrinally incorrect. It should be noted that the term “joint” refers to two or more services, e.g., Army and Air Force. Exercises can be both joint and combined, while most combined exercises are singleservice combined exercises. The primary purpose of combined exercises is the training of U.S. forces, emphasizing interoperability and capability building, though the host nation also benefits from the training as well. There are three types of exercises that may fall under this title:

• Field Training Exercises (FTX): These are the most realistic of exercises, taking the form of actual forces in the field, thus allowing all the moving parts to be tested. These are also the most resource intensive in money, manpower, material, and preparation time.

• Command Post Exercises (CPX): An exercise in which the forces are simulated, involving the commander, the staff, and communications/coordination among the participating headquarters.

• Table Top Exercises (TTX): Tabletop exercises are the least resource-intensive of these three types, ranging from a formal, detailed planning process to a simple discussion. TTXs are excellent when senior leaders want to explore a number for possible scenarios or possible futures.

Below are just a few examples of security cooperation exercise programs and related activities:

• “1251” Training for Eastern European National Security Forces in the course of Multilateral Exercises

• 321, Training with Friendly Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses

• 322, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces

• Defense Health Program

• Exercise-Related Construction (ERC)

• Joint Exercise Program

***Contacts***

There can be some confusion about the definition of contact events and/or Military-to-Military (M2M) events. In the past, Section 168 of Title 10 provided authorization for contact events and/ or Mil-to-Mil events. However, part of NDAA 2017, Section 168, was repealed, and these types of events are now authorized under Chapter 16 of Title 10, specifically Subchapter II Military-to-Military Engagements. One of the most important things to remember is that events conducted under this authority should not cross into the training realm. They should be designed to enable defense and military leaders to engage with partner countries for discussions, exchanges of tactics, planning, and other purposes that encourage democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries; but not training. Contacts are largely conducted between U.S. military and civilian defense personnel and the military and civilian defense personnel of a partner country but may also include non-defense personnel of partner countries who play key security roles. Events, normally, but not always, fall into one of these categories:

• Traveling contact teams

• Familiarization visits

• Military liaison teams

• Seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations

• Distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations

• Personnel expenses of DoD personnel as they relate to above activities

Below are just a few examples of the authorities under which DoD conducts contact events:

• 311, Exchange of Defense Personnel between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority

• 312, Payment of Personnel Expenses Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation

• 342, Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS)

• 344, Participation in Multinational Military Centers of Excellence

An organization that might be involved in supporting contact events is the National Guard, which is part of the Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP), which is authorized under 10 USC 341 (Title 10, Chapter 16, subchapter V). More on this later in this chapter.

***Exchanges***

There are a variety of options for conducting exchanges of military and civilian defense personnel with partner countries that may be used to develop familiarity with partner country systems, processes, interoperability, and technical expertise. There can be exchanges of civilian or military personnel between DoD and ministries of defense. There can be exchanges of military personnel between units of U.S. armed forces and foreign armed forces. There can also be exchange of personnel on a nonreciprocal basis. Below are just a few examples of the authorities under which DoD conducts exchanges:

• 311, Exchange of Defense Personnel Between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority

• Reciprocal, No-charge Flight Training School

• Reciprocal, No-charge Professional Military Education (PME) Student Exchanges

• Reciprocal, No-charge Unit Exchanges

Security Force Assistance

Lessons learned from the combat activities and subsequent foreign government reconstitution efforts in Southwest Asia drove the Department of the Army (HQDA) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to develop a new concept of operations titled Security Force Assistance (SFA). HQDA FM 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 2009 (superseded by FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 22 January 2013), is the first document to define SFA as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. The following year, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68 of 27 October 2010 titled “Security Force Assistance” established DoD policy for SFA and assigned responsibilities. The directive restated the definition of SFA to be DoD activities that contribute to the unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.

Moving from tactical to strategic levels, SFA is engagement at the tactical and operational level, Defense Institution Building (DIB), as part of Institutional Capacity Building (ICB), is engagement at the operational (ministerial) level and Security Sector Assistance (SSA) is engagement at the strategic, whole-of-government level.

According to the April 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23), strategic-level SSA aims to strengthen the ability of the U.S. to help allies and partner nations build their own security consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law across their government. The DoS has the lead on SSA and convenes the Interagency SSA Oversight Board, which they co-chair with DoD. SSA objectives with a PN should reflect the objectives of the respective U.S. embassy’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). In this respect, SSA is a coordinated USG effort focused on helping countries fight alongside U.S. forces countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participate in international peacekeeping operations, and maintain law and order in their respective countries.

SFA encompasses all of the activities required to develop a FSF, identifying and generating needed functions from the leadership level of the PN ministry of defense down to the entry-level private. The FSF and the broader terms of the security sector encompass the military, paramilitary, police, intelligence forces, border police, coast guard, customs officials, prison guards, and correctional personnel that provide security for a partner nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. U.S. DoD civilians, contractors, conventional, and Special Operations Forces can be the providers of SFA. As a subset of DoD security cooperation, SFA draws from multiple security cooperation programs to include security assistance (Title 22) for resources.

That said, there are parameters for what SFA is and, more clearly, what does not qualify as SFA. 3-07.1 states that (1) the mere provision of defense articles without related training is not SFA, (2) military exchange programs are not SFA, (3) humanitarian assistance and civic action are not SFA, and (4) joint exercises are not SFA. Combined operations must include U.S. forces as advisors, mentors, partners, or augmenters within FSF units to be SFA, and not U.S. units conducting independent operations alongside FSF.

In summary, as part of security cooperation activities, SFA, DIB, and SSA all work together at their respective levels with our partner nations toward strengthening their FSF capabilities while also supporting U.S. national security goals and achieving DoD security cooperation end states.

Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP)

As previously mentioned, Section 341, Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP) allows the National Guard of U.S. states and territories to interact and exchange personnel with civil, military, and emergency/disaster response personnel of friendly partner nations. Many of these same partner nations will have an assigned Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) from the National Guard state partner leading and managing the SPP effort and coordinating other mil-to-mil events. The National Guard partner may also conduct humanitarian assistance and training events when authorized.

The National Guard’s involvement reflects an evolving international affairs strategy using the unique civil-military nature of the National Guard to interact with both civil and defense personnel of foreign countries. The state partners actively participate in a host of engagement activities, e.g., bilateral familiarization and training events, emergency management, environmental remediation exercises, fellowship-style internships, educational exchanges, and civic leader visits. All activities are coordinated through the CCMD and the U.S. Ambassador’s country team, and other agencies, as appropriate, to ensure that National Guard support is tailored to meet both U.S. and country objectives. Table 1-1 illustrates the partnerships.

All state National Guards have an SPP coordinator who manages the program from the state National Guard headquarters. This program also includes the exchange of authorized National Guard personnel with military forces, security forces, or other government organizations of a country whose primary functions include disaster or emergency response.

Typically, funding of SPP activities is not availed unless the activity is jointly approved by the applicable combatant command and chief of mission/ambassador. The National Guard members must be on active duty to use these funds. National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) issue annual changes, and it is imperative to check with respective CCMDs for the latest guidance.

**[Table 1-1 OMITTED]**

Summary

Security assistance has been part of our nation’s history ever since the Revolutionary War. Since World War II, the USG has progressively institutionalized and leveraged security assistance as a tool to advance U.S. interests in a global environment.

The term security assistance itself is subject to differing interpretations. The relatively recent development and use of the term security cooperation, which incorporates DoD-managed security assistance programs, has become the standard to describe all DoD international activities.

If the past is any predictor of the future, security cooperation will be in existence for many years to come. In this regard, the words of former Deputy SecDef, William P. Clements, Jr., are as appropriate today as when they were spoken years ago:

Many contend that such a program [as security assistance] has outlived its usefulness and is an anachronism in these days of a trend towards détente. To do so is not only to misread the history of the past twenty-five years but to misinterpret the signs of the times. The record is open to all who care to consult it. That record fully substantiates the conclusion that the world situation in which we currently find new hope for the future would not exist if the people of the United States had earlier refused to concern themselves with the common defense of the Free World. Had we not become involved and, for more than two decades, supported and encouraged the efforts of allied and friendly countries to protect themselves against threats to their territorial integrity and internal security, the complexion of the globe might be dangerously different today, and the international climate far more hostile. [Commander’s Digest, July 12, 1973]

The above 1973 historical quote highlights the evolution of SC and underscores the extraordinary changes to SC issued by the FY 2017 NDAA. The increasing scope of SC activities to include all DoD international programs and those FAA/AECA-authorized programs administered by DSCA is testament to increased DoD policy responsibilities and the imperative to develop the SC workforce. Execution of foreign policy in terms of SC reaches from the Secretary of Defense through DSCA to the CCMD, and finally to the in-country SDO/DATT, DAO, and SCO. Increasingly, almost every community within DoD and its respective leadership is recognizing the role they play in SC and the pivotal role SC plays in achieving U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

#### Here’s the actual DoD definition their ev is referencing

DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD\_513203\_on\_Security\_Cooperation.pdf /MSU-KM

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

**country-specific security cooperation section**. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

**Integrated Country Strategy**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

**international agreements**. Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.

**defense institution building**. Defined in DoDD 5205.82.

**SCOs**. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions. SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.

**senior defense official/defense attaché**. The chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official/defense attaché in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attaché or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

**security assistance**. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

**security sector assistance**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

#### Most comprehensive review of BOTH cooperation and assistance authorities agrees

GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-255r.pdf /MSU-KM

House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.

**[FOOTNOTE 4]**

4 Various government and nongovernment entities have compiled lists of security cooperation efforts, including security assistance efforts administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), but none of the lists are sanctioned by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as both current and complete.

**[/FOOTNOTE 4]**

To develop an inventory of BPC security cooperation and security assistance efforts, we reviewed data, documents, and reports from DOD, State, RAND, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS); conducted searches of laws; and reviewed prior GAO reports. We interviewed DOD, State, RAND, and CRS officials about their research on, and listings of, security cooperation and security assistance efforts used for BPC and the efforts’ associated authorities; the methodologies they used; and the limitations they encountered. The efforts we selected for our inventory comprise what our sources referred to as “programs,” “subprograms,” “tools,” “funding accounts,” “authorities,” or “activities.” We used “efforts” as the most inclusive possible term, because the DOD and DOD-sponsored sources we consulted used undefined and varying terminology—for example, sometimes using terms such as “programs” and “activities” interchangeably and sometimes including funds and the names of authorities—and because these sources and DOD officials did not provide DOD-sanctioned definitions of the program and subprogram levels for security cooperation programs. We broadly defined building partner capacity to include efforts that were intended solely to build partner security capacity as well as those that could have a partial or ancillary effect on partner security capacity. For example, we included military exercises, training, and equipment as well as BPC-related personnel exchanges and military contacts. To focus our inventory on BPC efforts to address security-related threats, we excluded efforts whose sole purpose was humanitarian, health, disaster, or development assistance. To eliminate duplicative and expired efforts, we compared the data we obtained from these sources and reviewed associated authorities. We worked with DOD and State officials to resolve any discrepancies, to add additional efforts, and to group subefforts with overall efforts when the officials made such information available. See enclosure I for further information about our objective, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to March 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

### NEG AT: SC includes DoD-admin SA

#### The only reason their ev includes DoD-administered is because it’s defining SC in terms of DoD involvement, which reinforces our broader competition argument – worst-case, this argument only redefines the counterplan text to exclude one of our answers to their DoD key deficit (the answer that we can involve the DoD) BUT does NOT void competition

#### BUT, they’re wrong – even DoD uses security assistance, NOT cooperation, when describing programs like the counterplan

Epstein 18 Susan B. Epstein, Coordinator, Specialist in Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service; and Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics, Congressional Research Service; “U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends,” CRS Report for Congress, R45091, 2-1-2018, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf> /MSU-KM

**Interagency Terminology**

Discussion of military and related assistance to foreign countries is sometimes hindered by a lack of a standard terminology.9 The following terms are frequently used to describe assistance to foreign governments, security services, and militaries:

* Security Assistance (Title 22). Although not defined in Title 22 of U.S. Code, the term security assistance is commonly used to refer to the six budget accounts for which the State Department requests international security assistance appropriations and whose underlying authorities reside in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and Arms Export Control Act in 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended.10

**[FOOTNOTE 10]**

10 Security assistance is also used as a generic term used throughout the U.S. government to describe assistance provided to foreign military and security forces, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ) identifies six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance,” which are commonly referred to as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD also uses the term security assistance to refer specifically to a group of State Department programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA), funded by State Department appropriations and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), an agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD)(P).

**[/FOOTNOTE 10]**

* Security Cooperation (Title 10). DOD uses the term security cooperation to refer to activities authorized by provisions in Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). The FY2017 NDAA defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:
* To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
* To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.
* To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.”11
* **Security Sector Assistance**. In April 2013, the Obama Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 23 (PPD-23). The directive called for an overhaul of U.S. security sector assistance policy and for the creation of a new interagency framework for planning, implementing, assessing, and overseeing security sector assistance. The term security sector assistance refers to all State Department security assistance programs and virtually all DOD security cooperation programs, exercises, and engagements, as well as related activities of the USAID, DOJ, and other agencies.12

**[FOOTNOTE 11]**

11 Section 1241(a), FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328). For the official DOD definition of security cooperation, see DOD Directive 5123.03, “DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 29, 2016.